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TABLE 1 
Korea: restrictive trade measures affecting exports (as of November 1980) 
Country 
Aus tralia 
Austria 
Benelux 
Canada 
Denmark 
Buropean Cornmunity 
Finland 
Textiles 
Footwear 
Cornmodities affected 
Sheets and plates of iron and steel 
Electric refrigerators 
Passenger motor vehicles 
Electric insulators 
Razors and sorne other metal products 
Leather clothing 
Plywood 
Sleeping bags 
Tire cords and fabrics 
Textiles 
Cutlery 
Textiles 
Leather coats 
Nonrubber feotwear 
Cutlery 
Textiles 
Steel 
Canned mushrooms 
I Certain textiles 
Rubber boots 
Main type of measures 
Tariff quota 
Global quota 
Global quota 
Global quota 
Global quota 
Tariff quota 
Global and tariff quotas 
Tariff quota 
Tariff quota 
Tariff quota 
Tariff quota 
Bila teral quota 
Voluntary export restraint 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral quota 
Global quota 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral queta 
Voluntary export restraint and minimum 
pricing system 
Voluntary expert restraint 
Bilateral queta 
Impor! deposi t 
Year of 
introduction 
1974-77 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1974-76 
1978 
1974 
1977 
1977 
1974 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1980 
1977 
New Protectionism 
Increasingly throughout the 1970's and 80's protectionist external-trade 
policies have proliferated in both the advanced and developing worlds. This 
new protectionism has been attributed to a variety of causes: the wor1d 
recession, intensified by the two oi1 crises of 1973 and 1979; to the 
emergence of new economic powers, main1y Japan and other Asian countries; to 
techno10gica1 change; and to the introduction of a floating exchange rate 
regime. More accurately it should be described as renewed protectionism. 
During the period 1950 to 1970 the most obvious symptoms of protectionism 
subsided, but by no mean s disappeared, and the last decade or so has seen a 
reversal of this trend. Nonetheless, the tariff reductions painfully 
negotiated under the aegis of the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds have been retained, 
so resort to non-tariff barriers has been greater. In particular new devices 
ha ve been introduced and foremost amongst them ha ve been voluntary export-
restraint agreements (VER's). 
In this review 1 intend to look at the nature of the VER arrangements, the 
economic effects that appear to accompany their introduction and outline the 
political economy elements that explain their proliferation. 
Nature of VER arrangements: 
Brief History 
The earliest examples of VER's are to be found in the field of textiles and 
clothing which were introduced in the 1930's especially against Japan by 
Western European and North American countries. For example, Japan volunteered 
to restrict its exports to the USA from 1935 onwards. Indeed this restriction 
still app1ied until the 1960's when a much more comprehensive regulation of 
world trade in textiles and clothing was inaugurated under the first Multi-
Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 1974. Broadly this agreement was largely 
protectionist in that it prevented free trade but as has been reported by Wolf 
(1) for some exporting countries the provisions of the MFA resulted in larger 
traded volumes than would otherwise have been the case. Since then 
renegotiated MFA's have seen VER quotas cut back substantially e.g. the USA 
a110ws only 0.5 per cent annual increase in textile and clothing imports on 
two-thirds of the categories and no more than 2 per cent annua11y on the resto 
Protectionism in the steel trades is more recento Between 1968 and 1974 VER 
arrangements applied to European and Japanese exports to the USo In addition 
a 'trigger price' mechanism was introduced in 1976 to protect the US steel 
industry further against cheap Japanese imports. This measure helped to 
reduce Japanese exports considerably and in the 1980's there has been a tacit 
agreement between the two countries to restrict exports to the USo With a 
reduction in competition from Japan in the US market the European producers 
found the North American market attractive. The US steel industry 
subsequently pressed for VER's on European exports which were eventual1y 
agreed in 1982 and stil1 apply. In turn, the EEC has imp1emented contro1s, 
especially of a VER type, on imports of steel from such deve10ping countries 
as Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico and Brazi1. 
The most recent major industry to be subjected to protection is automobi1es. 
In 1981 the US and Japan agreed a VER on imports of cars from Japan and this 
was soon fo110wed by similar arrangements for the German, Ita1ian, French and 
British auto industries. In the case of the 1atter this was forma1ized by a 
VER negotiated by· the Japanese Automobi1e Manufacturers Association and the 
British Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders to 1imit Japanese imports 
into the UK to an 11 per cent market share (2). In addition the UK has VER's 
1. 
w 
Country 
France 
Germany, Fed. 
Rep. of 
Ireland 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Norway 
l. . _______ .. _. __ .. _ 
Cornmodities affected 
Radios, sound recorders 
Umbrellas and sunshades 
Miscellaneous manufactures (toys, 
carpets, chemical products, yachts) 
Silk fabrics 
Tiles 
Semiconductors 
Newsprint and paper 
Precision instruments 
Wristwatches 
Cutlery 
Footwear 
Fish, dried fish, and dried seaweed 
Tuna 
Raw silk, silk yarn, and silk fabrics 
Baseball gloves 
Footwear 
Cotton thread 
Nearly all i tems 
Textiles 
Cutlery 
Tires and tubes 
Tableware of porcelain, china, and 
pottery 
Leather clothing 
Ski boots 
Main type of measures 
Unilateral quota 
Unilateral quota 
Unilateral quota 
Administrative guidance and global 
quota 
Administrative guidance and global 
quota 
Global quota 
Global quota 
Administrative guidance 
Voluntary export restraint 
Voluntary export restraint 
Import licensing and quota 
Voluntary export restraint 
Import quota and voluntary export 
restraint 
Administrative guidance 
Import quota 
Administrative guidance 
Import licensing 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral quota 
Bilateral quota 
Year of 
introduction 
1971 
1971 
1974 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1979 
1960 
1975 
1974-76 
1975 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1978 
1979 
... 
Country Cornmodities affected Main type of llIeasures 
rJJJJJJJJJJ~JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ+JJJJJJJJJJJJ
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Footwear 
Textiles 
Leather clothing 
Black-and-white television sets 
Footwear 
Cutlery 
Textiles 
Canned mushrooms 
Nonrubber footwear 
Ginseng products 
Steel products 
Citizens' band receivers 
Color television sets 
Industrial fasteners 
Porcelain on steel coo~'tarÉ 
Sorne specialty steel products 
Global quota 
Bilateral quota 
Voluntary export restraint 
Bilateral quota 
Voluntary export restraint 
Voluntary export restraint 
Bilateral quota 
Voluntary export restraint 
Bilateral quota 
Import ban 
Trigger price system 
Increase in duty 
Voluntary export restraint 
Increase in duty 
Special duty 
Administrative surveillance 
--- ---.-----.--'--------------_--L-______ -,--_-:--__ .....l-. 
Year of 
i ntroduct ion 
1979 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1979 
1979 
1971 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1981 
on footwear (Taiwan, Korea, Poland, Czeehoslovakia), eolour TY's (Japan), 
b.laek and white TY's (Korea), eutlery (Korea and Japan), musie centres (Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan) and Christmas eards (USSR) amongst others. 
So me indieation of the size and seope of the impaet of the new proteetionism 
and espeeially VER's can be seen from TABLE 1, obtained from Hamilton (3), 
whieh shows restrietions on trade levied against Korean imports (as of 
November 1980). 
l. Charaeteristies of YER's 
There are six essential eharaeteristies possessed by aYER that distinguish it 
from most other forms of trade restrietion: 
(1) the importing eountry imposes an upper limit on foreign supply. 
(2 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
(6) 
Usually these are bi-lateral in nature i.e. agreements between two 
parties. There are exeeptions however, sueh as the MFA and the EEC 
restrietion on Japanese video reeorders; 
the imposition is defined by eommodity eategory; 
the souree of supply is speeified elearly; 
they are usually defined in volume rather than value terms; 
they are negotiated for a speeified period and 
the exporting eountry administers the restrietion arrangements. 
It· i s of val ue to compare thi s 1 i st of fea tures with those possessed by the 
most eommon restrietive teehnique i.e. the tariff. 
Tariffs are eommonly: 
(a) defined by eommodity group typieally more narrowly defined than a VER 
eategory 
(b) not souree speeifie. (MFN) elassifieation 
souree of supply 
Most tariffs fall into the most-favoured-nation 
and only preferential tariffs will define the 
(e) defined in value terms e.g. ad valorem tariffs 
(d) are normally permanently imposed and 
(e) are administered by the importing nation. 
Let us now turn to the impaet of YER's on both the importing and exporting 
eountries. 
2. Analysis of the effeets of YER's 
(i) lmporting Country 
The basie method of investigating YER's is via supply and demand 
teehniques similar to those used in tariff and quota analysis. In 
FIGURE 1 the market eondition for, say, eutlery is depieted within 
the importing country. The home eountry supply curve is Sh-Sh' 
5. 
For simp1icity we wi11 assume a11 foreign production is aggregated 
and together with $h this gives a wor1d supp1y curve $w-$w. 
Price 
o 
With free 
comprising 
imported. 
FIGURE 1 
Sw 
Quantity 
The.effects of a VER on the importing country. 
trade at a .sing1e wor1d price of Po the total consumption is 000 
two e1ements, 001' produced domestica11y and 01 00' which is 
If nowa VER is imposed 1imiting the import vo1ume to 02 03 < 01 00 the good becomes more scarce and its price rises to P in the home marRet. In the 
wor1d as a who1e it is reasonab1e to suggest1that as a resu1t there wi11 be 
excess capacity forcing foreign production to be reduced, with the remaining 
producers wi11ing to supp1y at a 10wer price than beforehand i.e. P2. 
Domestic production wi11 rise from O, to 02' which may we11 have been the main 
motive for the government introdacing the VER. But who captures the 
difference between the higher domestic price P, and the 10wer wor1d price P?? 
Foreign producers observe the rise in price in the home country due to tne 
imposition of the VER. In this simple examp1e producers can be assumed to be 
ever-interested in se11ing at the highest possib1e price and therefore there 
is no reason to se11 to the importing country at any price be10w P. Given 
that the administration of a VER rests with the exporting country then rent 
income wi11 accrue to the exporting country. In FIGURE 1 this rent is 
indicated by the shaded area. 
This fact is one good reason why exporting countries may prefer VER mea sures 
rather than a1ternatives such as tariffs or quotas where gains accrue to home 
residents (but not necessari1y citizens). 
However, FIGURE 1 is a simp1ification and sorne comp1ications shou1d be noted: 
6. 
(1) We have assumed that the domestie and foreign goods are perfeet 
substitutes in eonsumption. Th1s may not be true, but nonetheless 
the bas1e nature of the analysis remains. It 15 still the case that 
the priee of an imperfeet substitute is raised by the imposition of a 
VER. 
(2) It is often the case that VER's are imposed on top of tariffs and 
therefore the full trade barrier is a eombination of tariff and VER. 
This can be 1llustrated by taking the case of Hong Kong elothing 
exports to the UK within the period 1981-3. The tariff rate is fixed 
by the EEC whieh was then an ad valorem rate of 17 per eent. On top 
of this it is possible to estimate the ad valorem tariff equivalent 
of the VER. This is the gap between the domestie priee and the 
export supply priee whieh can be expressed as 
P1 P2 
P2 
This illustrates the tariff that would have been neeessary to eurtail 
domestie demand, imports and inerease domestie supply by the amounts 
determined by the VER. For the UK the tariff rate was 17 per eent 
and the Import tariff equivalent of VER's was 15 per eent giving a 
eombined barrier rate of 32 per eent. This value is very similar for 
other EEC members but is higher for EFTA members (approx 40 per eent) 
and the US (44 per cent). 
(3) The world supply curve is assumed upward-sloping. This implies that 
the home eountry's deeision to restriet trade affects world supply 
priee. If however, the importing eountry may fall into the small 
nation situation then its diversion has an insignificant impact on 
world price (e.g. Luxembourg). 
Effects on the trade pattern 
A VER is souree-specific; rarely does it affect all 
supply. This has important eonsequenees when VER's are 
a customs union or a free trade area. 
possible sources of 
imposed by members of 
We will extend the analysis by assuming that there are three eountries in the 
worl d: 
(a) the importing home country 
(b) a partner country. These two are members of the same free trade 
area, and 
(e) an outside country (the rest of the world). 
Let us assume that the home eountry wishes to protect employment and to 
aehieve this target wishes to sustain a given volume of domestic production. 
Rather than use tariff or quota restrictions or direct subsidy to home 
production, the government restricts foreign supply in the form of a VER. 
Being a member of a free trade area the restrietion on imports hits the 
outside country only whilst the partner country maintains its right of access 
to the home country market. The impaet of such mea sures can be seen in FIGURE 
2. 
7. 
Price 
FIGURE 2 
o Quantity 
The effects of a VER on the trade pattern. 
Here the aggregate supp1y of the home and partner countries is shown by Sh -
Sho' In order to simp1ify ana1ysis assume that the home country is sma11 Rnd 
tMat wor1d price remains unchanged. Under free trade OQ is produced 
domestica11y. Q1Q8 is imported, of which Q1 Q? comes from the pArtner. Assume 
that the home 9 vernment wishes to increase domestic production to OQ2' 
Imports are therefore restricted to Q2Q3 by a VER on the outside country 
1imiting imports from there to df. 
Impact on efficiency 
(a) Comparison with free trade. Despite the overa11 reduction of 
imports the 1eve1 of imports from the partner country rises both 
proportiona11y and abso1ute1y. Imports from the partner equa1 bd, 
1arger than bc (=ae) the 1eve1 existing under free trade. The 
increased imports from the partner = cd and the global efficiency 
10ss of the VER = edk (TT is para11e1 to Sh-Sh)' 
(b) Comparison with a global supp1y restriction. If a global restriction 
(e.g. tariff or quota) were to be imposed as an a1ternative then 
imports from the partner wou1d be to the 1eft of c, assuming a 
proportiona1 reduction in imports from both sources of supp1y. 
Impact on Economic Rent 
Whatever the type of trade barrier the domestic producers increase their 
economic surp1us to P PI bao The partner increases its surp1us on existing 
exports by ab'be (=ab8e). The partners' surp1us on increased exports =cde. 
The total overa11 gain to the partner nation is =abde. With a VER 1imiting 
exports to df the rent income accruing to outside country exporters is equal 
to the shaded area. Using the termino10gy of customs union theory we can see 
therefore that VER's wi11 tend to enhance trade diversion i.e. the rep1acement 
of imports from a low-cost source with imports from a higher-cost source. 
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Good practical examples of this are to be found in the clothing exports of 
Italy and Finland to their respective partners which have been stimulated by 
YER restrictions against outside competitors. 
Not all developing countries are subject to export restraints on their newly 
emergent products. Sometimes they may be the beneficiaries of YER's placed 
upon more advanced nations goods. For example, actions taken against Japanese 
exports have had important effects on trade patterns encouraging exports from 
non-restrained sources. In 1976 the US limited colour TY imports from Japan 
which gave a strong stimulus to TY exporters from S. Korea and Taiwan and 
generally enabled these countries to raise their export prices. YER's may 
therefore be seen in some instances as stimulating industrialization and trade 
from the newer developing countries and this is often regarded as a favourable 
effect. 
Upgrading 
Typically YER's are defined in physical units and within each category there 
are usually different grades or qualities with accompanying different world 
prices. Now as the YER is defined in physical units, the price increase due 
to the YER will be equal for all units within the same commodity category 
regardless of grade. As a consequence, a high cost or high quality variety 
within a commodity category will have a lower ad valorem YER tariff equivalent 
than the low cost grade. The following example illustrates the point: 
Worl d Market YER Rent Ad Yalorem 
Grade price per physical per physical tariff equivalent 
unit unit of the YER 
High qua 1 ity grade E100 E5 5 100 or 5 per cent 
Low qua 1 i ty grade E 50 E5 5 10 per cent 50 or 
From an exporters point of view it is rational to gear the export mix towards 
those with lower ad valorem YER tariff equivalents. As a consequence there is 
a tendency towards higher quality/more sophisticated exports. This effect of 
YER's has been labelled upgrading or tradinr-uP. Evidence of this process has 
been demonstrated by Fenstra in his invest gation into the impact of US YER's 
on Japanese automobile exports. With the rise in the price of Japanese cars 
in the USA, consumers received a quality increase in the product (4). 
(ii) Exporting Country 
Once again, in the attempt to simplify analysis, we assume that there 
are only two countries, an exporting and an importing one. The 
situation is illustrated in FIGURE 3 where O-O is the demand for 
exports and S-S is the export supply curve. 
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The effects of a VER on the exporting country. 
The free trade equilibrium is at quantity OR and price P. Now if export 
volume is restricted to OQ by means of a VER, the exportOsupply curve alters 
to S-S*. Price rises to P and supply price to P. Rent income is shown by 
the shaded area. This rent income reflects the v&lue of possessing access to 
the foreign market and P?P 1 is the scarcity value of an 'entrance ticket' to the export market. Moreover, this accrues to the exporting country. 
According to Hamilton's calculations (3) of the impact of VER's on Hong Kong's 
clothing industry the rent income accruing to exporters was equal to 1 per 
cent of GDP or 16 per cent of the industry's value added. 
Allocation of 'entrance tickets'. Given the potential gains to be earned by 
exporters the mechanism for allocating export licences is crucial. In 
principle there are two mechanisms: 
(a) a price mechanism with market prices for licences (similar to the 
Australian quota import licensing procedure) and 
(b) administrative decision-making process. 
15 a second step, trade in export licences could be allowed but typically 
here is no auctioning and no legally sanctioned trade. The usual process is 
or governments to hand out licences on some past performance criteria or 
,ave it to an industry cartel to sort out. Whichever is used there are some 
lrious questions of a political economy nature to be addressed, and it is for 
is whole area that 1 now turno 
10. 
The Political EcOnomy of VER's 
On the surface, at the level of conventional economic analysis, it is 
difficult to see the appeal of VER's compared to the traditional techniques of 
tariffs and quotas. VER I S are se 1 ective, do not cover a 11 sources of supp ly . 
create rent income for foreign producers and have the standard disadvantages 
typical of quantitative restrictions compared to ad valorem tariffs. Yet 
revealed preference by Governments indicates their growing popularity amongst 
trade administrators. If the justification is not to be found in economic 
analysis then the wider political economy perspective may be revealing. 
At the outset it must be pointed out that such agreements are not strictly 
'voluntary', since firms would not willingly restrict supply if profitable 
market opportunities are to be foregone. A genuinely voluntary agreement 
would involve individual companies choosing to restrict trade to improve their 
economic power on international markets and not being involved in negotiated 
agreements with foreign governments on export limits, usually organized via a 
cartel operation. Normally, the threat of alternative, more unwelcome, action 
by the importing country li es behi nd the VER. The term 'vol untary' i s 
therefore a misnomer but a very convenient misnomer for many of the parties 
involved. Let us look, therefore, at the various groups and see why they 
accept and encourage the development of VER 's. 
(a) Government of the Importing Country 
The Governments of importing countries see such techniques as a 
method of achiÉvin~ protectionist ends at low political costo Since 
the agreement is voluntary' and the restriction emanates from the 
exporting side it does not offend GATT restrictions on quantitative 
and discriminatory trade barriers (Articles XI, 11 and XIII). It also 
avoids the problem associated with raising tariff levels, namely, 
that such agreements should be GATT-sponsored and general in scope. 
Another considerable advantage is the ease of VER negotiation and 
implementation. In contrast with other forms of restriction a VER 
can be negotiated in secret, unhindered by public political processes 
and scrutiny. Given this secrecy it also has the likely additional 
advantage of being completed in a short period of time. This is, of 
course, highly attractive to politicians whose time-horizons tend to 
be short i.e. from election to election, and therefore they may be 
seen to respond to protectionist demands swiftly. Finally, because 
of the low profile of VER discussíons, polítical rísks are lowered 
for the Government. Polítical oppohents will be less aware of their 
nature and if there ís sorne hostile reaction it can always be pointed 
out that it is the exporting nation that is the source of the 
restriction. 
Lastly, because VER's are targeted on 'disruptive' suppliers, the 
likelihood of retaliation, with all the costs that may ensue will be 
reduced. 
(b) Producers in the Importing Country 
Most of the benefits to import-competing producers are of the 
traditional protectioníst type: the ability to raise prices and 
increase output. Above all, the most welcome aspect of a VER to this 
group is that it sets a quantitative limit on imports. This is 
particularly the case where domestic producers are lagging behind 
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wor1d efficiency standards and are vulnerable to import 'disruption'. 
Specific producers can be identified as disruptive and b1ame assigned 
to them as being the source of unfair or disruptive trade practices. 
The p1ight of the domestic industry can be focused on some foreign 
competitors, thereby heightening protectionist sentiment whi1st sti11 
dec1aring unshaken faith in 'genuine' free trade. 
Possib1y, such domestic industries under threat might prefer more 
traditiona1 import quotas but the po1itica1 costs may be too high or 
risky. Therefore a VER may make an attractive second-best solution 
for the protectionist pressure groups. 
(e) Government and Producers in the Export Restraining Country 
Despite the advantages accruing to the importing country and 
producers it is nonethe1ess that such measures find favour and 
acceptance in exporting countries. One situation where this wi11 be 
understandab1e is where protectionist measures are seen as inevitable 
and where trade authorities in the exporting country wil1 be seeking 
to minimize the impact of restraints: a VER is more attractive than 
a fu11-b1oodied unilateral import quota. C1ear1y, it becomes a 
question of po1itica1 nerve and judgment as to the 1ike1ihood of 
stronger po1icies being a genuine threat. For po1icy-makers in both 
countries, one of the biggest advantages of a VER is that it reduces 
the uncertainty of bilateral trade re1ations. . 
For companies the advantages accrue from the creation of monopo1y 
rents as a resu1t of reducing export supp1y. Moreover, in order to 
imp1ement export restraint, the government must usua11y estab1ish 
some form of export cartel (if none exists a1ready). This forum 
through which export markets are organized wi11 tend to favour firms 
we11 estab1ished in the industry and wi11 tend to keep out potentia1 
newcomers from entering the export market. In addition, the sharing-
out of the export market may a1so 1ead to a 10wering of the variance 
of profit 1eve1s and thereby the overa11 risks associated with 
f1uctuating market conditions. 
(d) Exporters outside the agreement 
If a VER creates a shortfa11 in export supp1y then exporters not 
members of the agreement may a1so benefit. An increase in export 
price may a110w non-restraining exporters to increase supp1ies to 
the importing country, thereby expanding their market share. In a 
sen se they are 'free riders' of the increase in export price and 
whi1st they may be exc1uded from negotiations their interests c1ear1y 
1ie in encouraging export restraint. 
It may a1so be the case that in carte1ized or heavi1y concentrated 
industries - a trend itse1f promoted by VER's - there wi11 be a 
potentia1 for col1usion on an international scale to develop. For 
examp1e, potentia1 VER industries cou1d offer to adjust their supp1y 
1imits to favour non-participating countries in exchange for market 
shares e1sewhere. 
Fina11y, there is a prob1em that involves so-cal1ed 'rebound' 
nations. In so far as VER's cause exporters to redirect their supply 
towards other importing countries where markets are sti11 open then 
it may resu1t in considerable trade diversion. This outcome wi11 be 
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the direct consequence of the discriminatory nature of VER's and its 
impact will be felt by producers in the 'rebound' country and by 
governments that will have to deal with the economic and political 
fallout. 
(e) Import Consumers 
As is the case in other trade restrictions, the VER places the 
greatest burden on consumers in the importing country. This, of 
course, arises from the higher prices of the goods (both imported and 
domestically produced) resulting from its continued scarcity. The 
burden is, however, increased by the fact that whereas in the case of 
a tariff the domestic government would receive revenues to help 
compensate, in the case of a VER this tariff revenue is foregone. 
Hence the double burden. 
We can also see that as a VER deliberately sets out to worsen the 
terms of trade and consumers benefit then its political viability 
hinges on restricted access and understanding by the public to the 
negotiating process. 
Limitations and difficulties in VER policy 
For some economic and many political reasons all of the parties engaged in 
setting VER export limits stand to gain whilst potential opponents/losers are 
excluded from the negotiations. Nevertheless, the qualities of VER's that 
favour political expediency also bear the seeds of its weaknesses as a policy 
instrumento In particular, there are problems of enforcement and reactions 
from non-restraining exporters. 
Enforcement problems 
Carelessness in defining VER coverage can create loopholes for exporters to 
exploit. It may be that differentiated products can be exported in different 
categories so that no true restraint is actually practiced. We have also 
noted that if categories are defined broadly in terms of quality and value 
then there may be a 'trading-up' of quality goods. Thus, in order to be 
fully effective, a VER agreement must include detailed product-by-product 
quotas. 
Weaknesses are also likely to be exposed as events put stresses on the export 
cartel. Analytical and historical evidence suggests that cartel s are not 
long-lasting. For example, it may not succeed in bringing all exporters into 
the agreement. Even if it is successful, there is always the incentive to 
cheat on the quota allotment. This suggests that industries already highly 
concentrated or used to cartel discipline are more likely to be effective; 
thereby reinforcing their degree of concentration or market-sharing. 
Reactions from non-restraining-exporters 
It may be that producers in retraining countries break their export quota by 
exporting via a non-restraining country. This might be especially significant 
where the goods possess no distinguishable marks of origino To restrict this 
development very detailed monitoring and inspection procedures will be needed. 
Even if cheating did not exist it may be that the effectiveness of the VER may 
be eroded by non-restraining exporters increasing their supply into the 
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importing nation. World exports will tend to shift towards the more 
profitable VER-protected market thereby eroding the advantages of the policy. 
Conseguences of Failure 
Given the various possibilities of 'cheating', leakage and responses from non-
restricting exporters the trade authorities may have to decide whether to 
abandon the VER approach if it is failing or take steps to tighten the 
mechanism. 
One loqical response 'is to extend VER's to cover all exporters supplying the 
country s import market. This would cut off the possibility of secretive 
trans-shipments and di verted exports via nations outside the agreement. 
Global VER arrangements, however, would only heighten a further problem - that 
of VER comoliance. The threat of more severe sanctions might be effective for 
sorne time. However, such threats ultimately depend on the ability of the 
exporting country's authorities to maintain cartel discipline and monitor 
total exports. A more effective technique to induce compliance is to 
establish an automatic 'tripwire' whenever VER's are violated. The EEe, for 
example, has created a basic price system (BPS) which sUbjects imports of 
steel to antidumping investigations if the price 'alls below an agreed level. 
This price i$ calculated on average costs and representing the lowest 'fair' 
price that an exporter could charge without being considered to be 'dumping' 
steel. This BPS 1S suspended 'or exporters participating in a VER agreement. 
If, however, VER's are violated the BPS is activated. In this way, of course, 
the importing authority can arti'icially establish minimum prices and thereby 
limit the impact of imported competition. The USA similarly used a system of 
'trigger prices' against Japanese steel imports up to 1981. 
Conclusions 
In a recent review of the impact of VER's on the UK Greenaway and Hindley 
estimate that VER's cost the British consumer at least i80m per annum on video-
cassette recorders, i175m on cars, i52m on textile clothing and i28m on non-
leather footwear. Put another way, they imposed a cost of at least i80,OOO per job saved in the VCR industry. It clearly imposes considerable burdens.on the 
consumer, as do other more traditional mea sures. What is the distinguishing 
feature of VER's is its alignment of interests that rest more upon issues o, 
political economy than of economic analysis. 
The rise of the VER has clearly been a response to the problem of import 
disruption, especially within national industries undergoing structural 
decline and where foreign competition can be easily cartelized e.g. 
automobiles, textiles, steel and shipbuilding. Given the institutional and 
ideological constraints the VER emerges as the most e'ficacious means o, 
protecting politically sensitive 'crisis' industries. 
Ultimately its major significance lies in the impact on the conduct o, 
commercial diplomacy. Not only do VER agreements violate GATT principles but 
enhance the cause of market cartelization and collusive protectionism. The 
further spread of VER agreements could undo many of the galns of postwar 
trade liberalization. 
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